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 THE MARK OF THE PLURAL 
 Generic Generalizations and Race 
 Daniel  Wodak  and  Sarah-Jane  Leslie 
 Albert Memmi once wrote that “the mark of the plural” signals the depersonalization 
of the colonized: 
 The colonized is never characterized in an individual manner; he is entitled 
only to drown in an anonymous collectivity (“They are this.” “They are all the 
same.”). If a colonized servant does not come in one morning, the colonizer 
will not say that she is ill, or that she is cheating, or that she is tempted not to 
abide by an oppressive contract . . . . He will say, “You can’t count on them.” 
It is not just a grammatical expression. He refuses to consider personal, private 
occurrences in his maid’s life; that life in a speci c sense does not interest him, 
and his maid does not exist as an individual. 
 ( Memmi 1957/1991 : 129) 
 Memmi’s observations about the mark of the plural may strike some as obscure or hyper-
bolic. But we believe they are prescient. Drawing on recent work in linguistics, psy-
chology, and philosophy, we will argue that the mark of the plural plays an even more 
important, and more damaging, role in race relations than Memmi suggests. 
 Let’s clearly imagine the circumstance that Memmi describes. A white family’s black 
maid does not come to work one morning. The children ask why. The father answers: 
 (1) Blacks are unreliable. You can’t count on them. 
 Using (1) as our central case, we will ask  ve questions about the nature and effects of 
this speech act, and the wider phenomenon that it represents. 
 First, what is the grammatical expression employed, and what makes it distinctive? 
In section one, we explain that it is a  generic generalization about a racial group, and it 
shares the distinctive features of generic generalizations about animal groups, such as 
“Tigers have stripes,” “Ducks lay eggs,” and “Mosquitos carry the West Nile virus.” 
 Second, what does the use of generic generalizations communicate to “us” about 
“them”? What does the father’s use of (1) communicate to his children? In section two, 
we argue that it communicates that one racial group (blacks) is essentially different 
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from another (whites), and that this explains why members of that group possess a 
negative property (“being unreliable”), which in turn explains why those individuals 
behave as they do (why the maid has not come to work that morning). Despite its sur-
face simplicity, (1) communicates complex, false, and pernicious information that most 
likely could not be imparted to children in any other way. We offer an explanation of 
how this works. 
 Third, how does the use of generics about “us” affect “us”? In section three we argue 
that generics about racial groups expose members of those groups to two types of per-
nicious psychological pressures (“stereotype threat” and “ideal realization”). These 
pressures can bring it about that individuals who are members of the relevant group 
conform to harmful stereotypes about that group. 
 Fourth, how does the use of generic generalizations contribute to the very construc-
tion of the racial categories that divide “us” from “them”? In section four, we argue that 
generic generalizations are central to the construction of social categories like racial 
groups, and to masking the fact that those categories describe a constructed rather than 
natural world. 
 Finally, how should we change or challenge the use of generics about race? So much 
of the information that is communicated by (1) is not explicitly stated or consciously 
thought by the speaker or the audience. We argue that it is both dif cult and insuf cient 
for someone who is appropriately socially situated to negate the harmful falsehoods that 
are communicated by (1). We will end by noting that the Socratic method may be an 
ef cacious, albeit limited, way to engage with those who make claims like (1). 
 Before proceeding further, it is worth noting that while we will use (1) as our central 
example of a generic generalization about a racial group, this is a very broad phenomenon 
(consider, for instance,  Asians are good at math, Latinos are passionate , and the title of the 
popular 1992  lm  White Men Can’t Jump ). Since these generics presuppose and reinforce 
a division between an in-group (“us”) and an out-group (“them”), we will we continue 
to mention these categories throughout, though their referents are  uid: the in-group 
and out-group shift between generics. Obviously we do not endorse these categorization 
schemes; it would simply be remiss to ignore their salience in social cognition about race. 
 What Are Generic Generalizations? 
 Generic generalizations like (1) differ from quanti ed generalizations such as: 
 (2) All blacks are unreliable. 
 (3) Most blacks are unreliable. 
 (4) Some blacks are unreliable. 
 In many ways, (2)–(4) are similar to (1): they are all generalizations, after all. What 
distinctive features set (1) apart from (2)–(4), and why do they warrant our focus on 
generic rather than quanti ed expressions? 
 The most obvious and immediate feature that sets generic generalizations apart is 
the absence of a quanti er—“all”, “most,” or “some”—in (1). But this is only the way 
into a complex set of issues. The distinctive features of generics are best understood by 
considering examples of generics about animal groups like “Tigers have stripes,” “Ducks 
lay eggs,” and “Mosquitos carry the West Nile virus.” 
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 It is comparatively easy to understand what is communicated by quanti ed general-
izations like “All tigers have stripes,” “Most ducks lay eggs,” and “Some mosquitos carry 
the West Nile virus.” But it is more dif cult to capture what is communicated by the 
generic versions of these generalizations. Why is “Tigers have stripes” true even though 
there are albino tigers? Why is it true that  Ducks lay eggs , but false that  Ducks are female , 
even though there are more female ducks than egg-laying ducks? And why is it true to 
say “Mosquitos carry the West Nile virus” even though fewer than 1% do so, yet false to 
say “Mosquitos don’t carry the West Nile virus” even though some (in fact, over 99%) 
don’t do so? 
 To answer these questions, we must re ect on how we think about both the groups 
and the properties involved in these generic generalizations. We frequently make 
generic generalizations about kinds—like tigers, ducks, and mosquitos—that are highly 
essentialized in the psychologists’ sense: we implicitly take members of these kinds to 
share some distinctive, non-obvious, and persistent property or underlying intrinsic 
nature that causally grounds their common properties and dispositions (see Gelman 
(2003), and for discussion of the relationship between the philosophical and psycholog-
ical notion of essence, see  Leslie (2013 )). 
 Leslie (2007, 2008, 2012) argues that it is useful to distinguish three types of (descrip-
tive) bare plural generics, which correspond to different ways in which the property that 
is attributed is related to the relevant kind. First, there are  majority generics , where the 
property just happens to be possessed by  most members of the relevant kind (e.g., “Barns 
are red,” “Cars have radios”). Second, there are  characteristic generics , where the property 
is widely possessed by members of the kind in virtue of their common intrinsic natures 
(e.g., “Tigers are striped”). Third, there are  striking property generics . Here the property 
that is attributed is taken to be dangerous or harmful (such as the property of carrying 
the West Nile virus); this licenses the generic even when the property has a very low 
prevalence among members of the group, provided that the group is believed to have a 
shared intrinsic nature. Of these three types of bare plural generics, only majority gener-
ics are free of any implicit reference to the notion of a shared nature or essence. How-
ever, evidence suggests that majority generics are by default understood as characteristic 
generics (see  Cimpian and Markman 2009,  2011;  Haslanger 2011 ; and  Leslie 2014 ). 
 We propose that we should understand what is communicated by racial group gener-
ics along these same lines. That is, we should understand (1) as by default communicat-
ing that members of the kind  blacks share some distinctive, non-obvious and persistent 
property or underlying nature that causally grounds their common properties and dispo-
sitions, and that the property  being unreliable is characteristic of that kind (i.e., widely 
possessed by individuals who are black in virtue of their shared intrinsic nature). Other 
racial generics may involve striking properties (e.g., “blacks are violent”), and so get to 
be asserted independently of any controlling considerations of actual prevalence. 
 Our account of what is communicated by (1) is based on Leslie’s account of generics 
(see Leslie 2007, 2008, 2012). But it is not dependent on that view. For instance, we 
have said nothing about what information is communicated by (1) as part of its seman-
tic meaning rather than pragmatic implicature (as Haslanger 2014 proposes). Of course, 
for each semantic proposal there are objections and alternatives (such as a set-theoretic 
approach,  Barwise and Cooper 1981; see also Liebesman 2011, but cf.  Leslie 2015 ). For 
the sake of brevity, we will not consider them here. Our working account is fairly ecu-
menical, but not entirely uncontroversial. 
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 Why focus on generic rather than quanti ed generalizations? First, several research-
ers have proposed that generic sentences may be language’s way of letting us give voice 
to our cognitive systems’ most basic forms of generalization (e.g., Gelman, Sanchez and 
Leslie, forthcoming; Leslie 2008,  2012 ; Meyer, Gelman and Stillwell 2011; Sutherland, 
Cimpian, Leslie and Gelman 2015). Second, it is now well established that generic 
generalizations play a particularly important role in our cognition of social categories 
like “blacks” (see  Wodak et  al. 2015 , and references therein). Third, experimental 
evidence suggests that quali ed statements like (2) are recalled as generic generaliza-
tions like (1) (Gelman, Sanchez and Leslie, forthcoming; Leslie and Gelman 2012). 
So any attempt to understand the role played by quanti ed statements like (2) would 
be incomplete without an understanding of the role played by generics like (1). Finally, 
speci c forms of prejudice are passed on to children by adults—children do not inherit 
their prejudicial schemes of classi cation through their genes—and by far and away 
the most dominant form of child-directed generalizations are generic in form ( Gelman 
2003 ). 
 This is why we take the concerns raised by Memmi’s observations about the mark of 
the plural to be best understood in relation to the category of generic generalizations. 
Super cially there is some initial awkwardness about this, since not all generics involve 
bare plurals. There are generally taken to be three distinct syntactic types of generic 
reference:  rst, inde nite (aka “bare”) plural generics, like “Tigers hunt at night” and 
“Italians are fond of pasta”; second, inde nite singular generics like “A tiger hunts at 
night” and “An Italian is fond of pasta”; and  nally, de nite singular generics like “The 
tiger hunts at night” and “The Italian is fond of pasta” (Krifka et al. 1995). In the case 
of social categories, the de nite plural construction can take on a generic meaning, e.g., 
“The Italians are fond of pasta,” though outside the social realm this construction tends 
not to have a clear generic interpretation (Krifka et al. 1995). There are important con-
ceptual and linguistic differences between these types of generics (see, e.g., Greenberg 
2003;  Leslie et al. 2009 ;  Prasada, Khemlani, Leslie and Glucksberg 2013 ). But all that 
we wish to note here is that, setting these complications aside, the father could have 
had have a similar effect by answering his children with any of the following: 
 (5) The black is unreliable. You can’t count on them. 
 (6) A black is unreliable. You can’t count on them. 
 (7) The blacks are unreliable. You can’t count on them. 
 Understanding that there are singular and plural generics is important to any estima-
tion of the frequency of generics about race.  Zaidi (2010 ) lists examples of stereotypes 
about Hispanics from textbooks published between 1961 and 1993; many involve de -
nite singular generics, like “The Latin American considers his home his sanctuary” and 
“The Central American citizen is no more  t for a republican form of government than 
he is for an arctic expedition.” As Zaidi writes, these generalizations “portray Hispanics 
as one-dimensional characters that are de ned by their essences” (2010: 157). 
 We have already seen enough to suggest that it is unfortunate that generics about 
racial, ethnic and national groups continue to be printed in academic works. Occasion-
ally, but only occasionally, this attracts criticism. Consider the following passage from 
Richard J. Evans’s review of Alon Con no’s  A World Without Jews in the  London Review 
of Books : 
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 One of the book’s most obvious  aws is its constant reference to “Germans” as 
if all Germans were Nazis and Anti-Semites. Con no is careful not to include 
the de nite article, but time and again a statement about “some Germans” 
expands within a few pages to become simply “Germans.” Thus it was “Ger-
mans” who, “via the raw emotions of hatred, anger, mockery, fear, transgression 
and guilt” expressed in the burning of the Torah scrolls, “conveyed a sentiment, 
perhaps even an understanding, that a Germany without Jews was becoming 
a reality.” 
 (2015: 19) 
 These are uses of generics by an eminent professor of history in a book published by 
Yale University Press. Even the well-educated still use and accept generics about groups 
that give voice to cognitively primitive generalizations, and communicate essentialist 
beliefs. 
 Generics About  Them 
 In light of this, we can now clarify how generics like (1) about racial groups work 
to communicate complex, false, and pernicious information to non-members of the 
groups, including children. The relevant information comes in three stages. 
 The  rst stage concerns the nature of  them . In saying (1), the father implicitly commu-
nicates that “they” (blacks) are essentially different from “us” (whites). It communicates 
that blacks as a group share a distinctive essence, making them fundamentally different 
from “us”. This accords with the general tendency to view racial groups in essential-
ist terms: claims about “[t]he ‘soul of the Oriental,’ ‘Negro Blood,’ . . .  ‘the passionate 
Latin,’ ” Allport wrote, “all represent a belief in essence. A mysterious mana (for good 
or evil) [that] resides in a group, all of its members partaking thereof” ( 1954: 173–174). 
 This claim that generics transmit essentialist beliefs to children is supported by 
experimental evidence from  Rhodes, Leslie and Tworek (2012 ). In their experiments, 
four-year-old children and adults were shown an imaginary social group—“Zarpies”—
who could not be mapped on to any familiar essentialized group. The use of generics in 
describing Zarpies resulted in a marked increase in the tendency of children and adults 
to essentialize Zarpies. And the inculcation of essentialist beliefs about Zarpies in a 
separate group of adults resulted in a marked increase in their use of generics in describ-
ing Zarpies to children. This suggests an intimate connection between generics and 
essentialism: hearing generics results in the essentialization of social groups; and the 
essentialization of social groups increases the use of generics in describing those groups. 
 Hence, uses of generics like (1), particularly if repeated over time, are likely to impart 
to children the notion that blacks share a distinctive, fundamental inherent nature—a 
dangerous falsehood. Members of highly essentialized social groups are more likely to 
have diminished social status and be subjected to prejudice (Haslam et al. 2000, 2002). 
When “the civilized” essentialize others, Patterson writes, they “impoverish their own 
understanding of these other groups and obscure their own af nity with them. Ulti-
mately, this fuels their fear of these groups” (Patterson 1997: 87–88). 
 The second stage concerns the properties attributed via the generic. If  being unreliable is 
attributed as a characteristic property of blacks, this communicates not only that the chil-
dren can expect individual members of that racial group to share this negative trait, but that 
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little can be done to change this—it is grounded in their inherent nature, not explained 
by extrinsic circumstances. When striking properties—like  being violent —are attributed to 
racial groups, the audience will not even need much evidence of their prevalence to accept 
the generic. This would not be quite such bad news if the acceptance of generics did not 
result in poor probabilistic inferences about the likelihood of arbitrary members of the kind 
to have the striking property in question ( Khemlani, Leslie and Glucksburg 2012 ). Once 
accepted, striking property generics “appear to be commonly taken in a rather strong sense, 
as though the quanti er  always had implicitly crept into their interpretation” ( Abelson 
and Kanouse 1966 : 172). In other words, the cognitive mechanism which generics give 
voice to lets us rapidly move from “Some Germans were Anti-Semites” to “Germans were 
Anti-Semites,” which is then taken to have an inferential power akin to “All Germans 
were Anti-Semites”—this is the basis of Evans’s complaint against Cor no. 
 The third stage of the information communicated by generics is that they  explain 
salient phenomena. Generics like (1) are used to explain one individual’s conduct in 
terms of the properties of a group. Recall Memmi’s observation that the father explains 
the absence of the family’s maid by claiming that  they are unreliable. He does not consider 
alternative explanations, such as that  she is ill, or “tempted not to abide by an oppressive 
contract”: “He refuses to consider personal, private occurrences in his maid’s life; that life 
in a speci c sense does not interest him, and his maid does not exist as an individual.” 
 Even when a group-level explanation is apt, generics still communicate something 
mistaken: that the  intrinsic nature of the group, rather than their extrinsic circum-
stances, is the relevant explanatory factor. As Haslanger writes, the common features 
of conduct of members of a group often “obtain by virtue of [a] broad system of social 
relations within which the subjects are situated, and are not grounded in intrinsic or 
dispositional features of the subjects themselves”; yet this is “obscured” by the “system-
atically misleading” use of generics as explanations (2011: 179–180). 
 Zaidi’s examples of generics about Hispanics illustrate this point well. In  Spanish 
for Secondary Schools (1961), the authors wrote: “The Spaniard is primarily a man of 
feeling, rather than of action, foresight or method. His overvaluation of the individual 
diminishes his sense of solidarity with the larger community.” Zaidi notes that here 
the authors “fail to consider that if the people of Spain seemed somewhat lacking 
in expressions of solidarity in 1961, then perhaps the repressive Franco dictatorship, 
which by then had already ruled Spain for three decades, might have been at least 
partly to blame” (2010: 159). Similar observations are made about the  fth edition of 
 Civilización y Cultura , from 1991: “to read  Civilización y Cultura , one would think that 
underdevelopment, poverty, and crime result from congenital defects in Puerto Ricans 
rather than from colonization and globalization” (2010: 166). These are instances of 
what Andrei  Cimpian (2015) calls the “inherence heuristic”: an intuitive tendency 
to explain patterns (Puerto Rican poverty and crime) in terms of the inherent (i.e., 
“essential”) properties of their constituents (Puerto Ricans’ “congenital defects”), while 
overlooking extrinsic, environmental factors. 
 As we move further into the political sphere, it becomes more apparent that the use 
of such generics as explanations is intimately connected to tacit  justi cations . Consider 
the opinion of Lord Cromer, the English representative in Egypt from 1882 to 1902: 
 Want of accuracy, which easily degenerates into untruthfulness, is in fact the 
main characteristic of the Oriental mind. The European is a close reasoner; his 
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statements of fact are devoid of any ambiguity; he is a natural logician, albeit he 
may not have studied logic; he is by nature skeptical and requires proof before 
he can accept the truth of any proposition; his trained intelligence works like 
a piece of mechanism. The mind of the Oriental, on the other hand, like his 
picturesque streets, is eminently wanting in symmetry. His reasoning is of the 
most slipshod description. 
 (as cited by  Said 1994 : 38) 
 This stream of generics about “the European” and “the Oriental” is a tacit justi cation 
for the power of the former over the latter. That “they” are fundamentally different from 
“us” not only explains why they are powerless and we are powerful; it justi es the right 
of “the European” to “not only to manage the nonwhite world but also to own it” ( Said 
1994 : 108). 
 So, by saying (1) the father communicates to his children that  they (blacks) are 
essentially different from  us (whites), and that these differences explains why  they 
possess a negative property (unreliability), which in turn explains why those indi-
viduals behave as they do (why the maid has not come to work that morning); and 
moreover, it tacitly justi es why  we have  them as servants, rather than vice versa. It 
is hard to imagine a better way of communicating such complicated, misleading, and 
harmful information to any audience, let alone to young children, in so few words. 
 Generics About  Us 
 Generics about racial groups not only shape how we see others, but how we see our-
selves. Generics about  us communicate that we are essentially different from  them . 
One non-obvious reason why this is harmful is that essentialist beliefs undergird a   xed 
conception of abilities, with the resultant conception of certain demanding tasks as 
requiring inherent, natural talents, rather than hard work and incrementally acquired 
traits. When individuals adopt a  xed conception of abilities they are more likely to 
underperform in, or just avoid, challenging activities; failures are taken to be evidence 
of immutable shortcomings (Dweck 1999,  2006 ). (One possible explanation for the 
dearth of African Americans, as well as women, in academic  elds like philosophy is 
that members of that marginalized group are falsely led to believe that they lack the 
inherent talents required for success in the  eld  and to believe that others regard them 
lacking those inherent talents ( Leslie et al. 2015 ).) 
 Relatedly, if an individual’s membership in a social kind is made salient, this can 
impair that individual’s performance in certain activities. This robustly documented 
phenomenon is known as “stereotype threat,” the effects of which are ampli ed if 
either the group is viewed in essentialist terms or the performance is thought to be 
grounded in a  xed ability (for an excellent overview, see Steele 2010). A highly perti-
nent illustration of stereotype threat comes from an experiment where black and white 
students were engaged in the same activity: playing golf ( Stone et al. 1999 ). When stu-
dents were told that the activity was testing their “sports intelligence,” black students 
underperformed. When students were told that the activity was testing their “natu-
ral athletic ability,” white students underperformed. Black and white students know 
that the generics “blacks are unintelligent” and “whites are not naturally athletic” 
are commonly believed. Repeated experiences of stereotype threat not only impair 
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performance, but result in diminished con dence in one’s abilities and interest in the 
relevant activity (Gilovich 2006: 467–468); en masse, this can seem to con rm the 
stereotype. 
 There is a clear connection—which is supported by further research ( Cimpian 
et al. 2012)—between stereotype threat and generics. The problem that the students 
in the preceding experiment face is that once a negative stereotype about their group 
is made salient, they no longer appear to themselves just as individuals: they show 
awareness that their individual performance as golfers will be judged as represen-
tative of their group, in accordance with stereotypes about that group. Even high-
lighting an individual’s membership in a positively stereotyped group can impair her 
performance, provided that the stereotype is activated in a blatant manner (Cheryan 
and Bodenhausen 2000). When the stereotype is activated subtly, individuals’ per-
formance may improve: this is the phenomenon of “stereotype lift” ( Walton and 
Cohen 2003 ). 
 While stereotype threat affects both dominant and marginalized groups (as in the 
gol ng experiment), the effects on the latter are more pernicious. In the United States 
there are far more negative stereotypes about blacks than whites. And there are far 
more activities that white individuals can engage in without being conscious of their 
race, which is often regarded as naturally diverse, and so not as susceptible to speci c 
stereotypes. Other racial groups do not have this privilege. 
 Stereotype threat is a well-documented pernicious psychological pressure affecting 
individuals’ behavior (see meta-analyses by Nguyen and Ryan (2008) and  Walton and 
Cohen (2003 )). But it is not the only psychological pressure connected to the use of 
generics about racial groups. Another is what we will call “ideal realization.” 
 This pressure is connected to normative, as opposed to descriptive, generics. To illus-
trate the distinction, consider “Boys cry” and “Boys don’t cry.” Both could be accepted, 
without incoherence, when the former  describes how crying is characteristic of boys 
while the latter  proscribes crying by boys. “Boys don’t cry” communicates that there are 
distinct  ideals for boys and girls, and that not crying is part of the ideal of boy-ness, such 
that individual boys who cry are admonished for failing to instantiate or realize this 
ideal. (For different ways of understanding this ideal and its connection to the seman-
tics or pragmatics of generics, see Leslie 2015, and Haslanger 2014). Normative generics 
exert a signi cant psychological pressure: they create a sense of obligation among mem-
bers of a group to possess features which otherwise few would feel either an obligation 
or a desire to possess ( Leslie 2015 ). 
 Descriptive and normative generics can be hard to disentangle, given that they 
have the same surface form. One way to distinguish the two is to consider the use 
of graded comparisons. In a society where normative generics like “Women are sub-
missive” and “Men are assertive” are widely accepted, an assertive woman might be 
declared “more of a man” than a submissive man. Consider Linda Grant’s comment 
in 2012 that Margaret Thatcher “is twice the man and twice the woman of any 
other MP [Member of Parliament]”. Similarly, we encounter seemingly paradoxical 
threshold claims such as “Hillary Clinton is the only man in the Obama adminis-
tration.” These claims are best understood as assessments of the degrees to which 
individuals realize distinct gender ideals: Hillary Clinton was taken to instantiate 
ideals of masculinity to a greater degree than her male colleagues (for more discus-
sion, see  Leslie 2015 ). 
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 Similar graded and threshold claims are made with regard to racial groups. Biracial 
children in the United States are frequently taken to be, in the words of Earl Sweat-
shirt, “too white for the black kids, and too black for the whites.” Barack Obama has 
frequently been accused of “acting white,” most notably by Jesse Jackson in 2007. In 
October 2014, (black) Seattle Seahawks players reportedly declared that their (black) 
quarterback Russell Wilson was “not black enough.” Ex-NBA star Charles Barkley 
responded: 
 With young black kids [who] do well in school, the loser kids tell them, oh, 
you are acting white . . . [F]or some reason, we are brainwashed to think if you 
are not a thug or an idiot, you are not black enough. If you go to school, make 
good grades, speak intelligent, and don’t break the law, you are not a good 
black person. 
 Both the initial report about the Seahawks, and Barkley’s response, remain controver-
sial, as is the empirical literature on the phenomenon of “acting white” (see  Fryer and 
Torelli 2010 ). But the general point stands: in-group generics can work to (1) essential-
ize features of the group and (2) insinuate tendentious group-wide ideals. 
 In summary, the use of generics about  us communicates that  we are an essentialized 
kind (exposing individuals to stereotype threats) and that  we ought to instantiate the 
ideals of  our kind (exposing individuals to a further pressure to conform to harmful 
stereotypes). 
 The Construction of  Us and  Them 
 Barkley’s response helps to illustrate the complex relationship between descrip-
tive and normative generics. One way to understand this connection is in terms of 
Haslanger’s claim that two assumptions form part of the common ground in conversa-
tions that employ generics ( 2014 : 379): a descriptive assumption that robust regulari-
ties are due to the essential natures of things, and a normative assumption that things 
should express their essential natures. Now consider the generic “blacks are thugs.” 
This claim might be accepted by those who take thuggishness to be a  striking property 
of blacks: it is a dangerous, though not prevalent, attribute of some members of this 
racial group. Once accepted, striking property generics are often employed as though 
the property they involve was in fact prevalent—as though, as Abelson and Kanouse 
frame it, the quanti er “always” had implicitly crept into their interpretation. So 
some might come to accept that thuggishness among blacks is a robust regularity, and 
hence assume that it is a  characteristic property of blacks. Here Haslanger’s suggestion 
would be that it is assumed that blacks  should express their (falsely) essentialized 
natures; thus “blacks are thugs” comes to be accepted as a  normative generic. This 
leaves individual blacks in the fraught position wherein behaving in ways that can be 
deemed “thuggish” is taken to con rm an offensive descriptive generic, yet abstaining 
from such behaviors can lead to their being admonished for “acting white” or “not 
being black enough.” 
 This relationship between descriptive and normative generics produces loop-
ing effects. Once a group is highly essentialized, unusual, aberrant actions on behalf 
of the few may be taken to characterize the group as a whole (for discussion, see 
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Leslie, forthcoming), and uncommon traits may be taken to be statistically normal. 
As Haslanger writes, “what’s statistically normal is taken to be evidence of how things 
are by nature,” and hence an inevitability to be accommodated; and how things are by 
nature is taken to be how things “ought to be,” and thereby legitimated and socially 
enforced ( Haslanger 2014 : 389). The use of descriptive and normative generics in 
determining what is normal, natural, and good helps explain how stereotypes of par-
ticular racial groups are socially constructed: that is, it helps explain how traits like 
thuggishness have become associated with groups like blacks. 
 Generics may play a further role in the social construction of race. As Appiah (1996: 
54) famously argued, there are no actual racial groups whose members share an essence 
(or, in his words, share “certain fundamental, heritable, physical, moral, intellectual, 
and cultural characteristics with one another that they [do] not share with members 
of any other race”). But on many plausible views (see  Ritchie 2015 ), false essentialist 
beliefs are causally or constitutively involved in the social construction of racial groups. 
We know that hearing racial generics results in the essentialization of social groups, and 
conversely the essentialization of social groups increases the use of generics in describ-
ing those groups. Moreover, such generics  mask the fact that these racial categories are 
socially constructed: once groups are essentialized, categories that are arti cial come to 
seem natural, and a social order that is historically contingent and changeable seems 
inevitable and immutable—or at the very least, simply responsive to the “natural” social 
order. 
 Changing and Challenging Generics 
 If racial generics play a role in the persistent social construction of race, then successful-
ly changing or challenging the use of generics about racial groups may be a particularly 
ef cacious means of changing the social construction of race. But  how can we success-
fully change or challenge the use of generics about race? 
 Langton, Haslanger and Anderson (2012) argue that we should “insist on explic-
itly quanti ed statements.” If you were to restrict yourself to quanti ed generalizations 
about racial groups, this would be a commendable change in your own conduct. But 
it would not be enough. The information communicated by your quanti ed general-
izations may be recalled by others in generic form ( Leslie and Gelman 2012 ; Sanchez, 
Gelman and Leslie, forthcoming). And your abstaining from generics about race does 
not redress the harms caused by others’ uses of generics like (1), if they are simply left 
unchallenged. 
 Effectively challenging generics like (1), however, turns out to be quite dif cult. In 
part, this is because generics are dif cult to negate by appealing to counterexamples. 
“Tigers are striped” is true even if there are some stripeless albino tigers, and “Mosquitos 
carry the West Nile virus” is true even if 99% of mosquitos don’t carry the West Nile 
virus. Likewise, many will accept “blacks are unreliable” even when they are aware that 
some, many or most blacks are highly reliable. Even if one were aware that  no blacks 
are thugs, one may continue to assert that “blacks are thugs” as a normative generic: 
one would simply take all actual blacks to fall short of this ideal, just as one can take 
all actual women to fall short of the ideals (e.g., “submissiveness”) associated with that 
gender category. “There are no real women any more” is a not-unheard-of old-school 
social conservative lament. 
AuQ2
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 This dif culty in challenging generics like (1) is compounded by  slippage between 
different interpretations of the same generic. Langton, Haslanger and Anderson 
(2012) discuss this with regard to a speaker’s use of the generic “Latinos are lazy.” You 
could respond by presenting an onslaught of counterexamples, but then the speaker 
can accept that “although many Latinos aren’t lazy, they tend to be—thus embracing 
the characteristic generic”; or, alternatively, you could respond by arguing that Lati-
nos show no greater tendency towards laziness than any other group, but the “speaker 
can then suggest that, although it is not part of the nature or essence of Latinos 
to be lazy, most are.” The fact that majority, characteristic, striking, and normative 
generics all take the same surface form allows for a “slide back and forth between 
different interpretations of the utterance,” which in turn “allows speakers to avoid 
taking responsibility for the implications of their claims” ( Langton, Haslanger and 
Anderson 2012 ). 
 A  nal dif culty with challenging generics like (1) is that much of the harmful infor-
mation it communicates is not explicitly stated or consciously thought by the speaker or 
the audience. Responding with “blacks aren’t unreliable” or “blacks aren’t thugs” does 
not negate the  presupposition that there are distinct essences and/or ideals for whites and 
blacks. This presupposition is especially hard to negate when it is transmitted to young 
children who can understand generics, but cannot explicitly understand notions like 
“essence” and “ideal.” 
 Where does this leave us? We agree with  Langton, Haslanger and Anderson (2012 ) 
that generics about racial groups should be rejected because they  either contain, pre-
suppose, and implicate harmful falsehoods  or can easily be interpreted to do so. But 
we suggest that a more successful means of challenging such generics may be to engage 
in Socratic inquiry. If a speaker makes claims like (1), ask what he or she means. Ask 
probing questions that make slippery claims precise and implicit assumptions explicit. 
“Do you think all blacks are unreliable? If not, what percentage of blacks do you think 
are unreliable? What percentage of whites do you think are reliable? What explains 
the difference? Is it in the nature of blacks to be unreliable, or is this just a historical 
accident?” Instead of assuming the dif cult burden of showing that the utterance was 
false, force the speaker to take responsibility for and either defend or disavow whatever 
falsehood they had in mind. 
 Of course, the Socratic method only addresses  linguistic obstacles (slippage, presuppo-
sition) to challenging generics. So it has serious limitations: it does nothing to resolve 
other obstacles, like the entrenched power dynamics that make it all but impossible for, 
say, a black servant to challenge a white father’s use of generics like (1). 
 Conclusion 
 Memmi’s remarks about the mark of the plural may strike many as obscure or hyper-
bolic, but we believe that they can be made precise by homing in on a particular class 
of grammatical expressions—generics—that make individual members of marginalized 
racial groups “drown in anonymous collectivity.” Indeed, we have argued that generics 
are involved in the construction and transmission of the racial categories that divide  us 
from  them , and in doing so communicate false beliefs about distinct essences, ideals, and 
properties. These beliefs shape how we see others, how we see ourselves, and how we see 
our social world, in ways that are deeply morally objectionable yet dif cult to challenge. 
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